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INTRODUCTION
George, a commercial diver,1 is employed by Black Mud Diving, Inc.
(“Black Mud”). Black Mud is a professional diving company based out of
New Orleans, Louisiana, and it partners with Blue Mountain Drilling Co. to
assist in its drilling operations.2 For months at a time, George lives on Black
Mud’s various vessels and goes out to numerous drilling rigs to dive and
perform underwater operations off the drilling rigs and oil wells. He is not
assigned to these vessels,3 but the vessels transport George and other divers
to the drilling rigs and provide a platform from which they work and store
their monitoring and diving equipment. George neither assists in the
navigation of nor performs other work on any of the vessels. After several
Copyright 2018, by COLTON V. ACOSTA.
1. The Louisiana Supreme Court articulated a so-called “diver’s exception” to
the jurisprudential requirement that an employee be working for an identifiable fleet
of vessels to have seaman’s status in Wisner v. Prof’l Divers of New Orleans, 731 So.
2d 200, 205 (La. 1999). Landry v. Specialty Diving of La., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 629,
634 (E.D. La. 2003), aff’d, 110 Fed. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2004). The Wisner court
identified divers’ work as “inherently maritime.” Wisner, 731 So. 2d at 204. Wisner,
however, dealt with a different issue—namely, the identifiable fleet of vessels
requirement—and, at least within the Fifth Circuit, divers have only been held to be
seaman if they satisfied 30% of their working time on board a vessel. See Willis v.
Fugro Chance, Inc., 278 F. App’x 443, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding diver did not
qualify as a seaman because he did not spend 30% of time on board a vessel); see also
Little v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 So. 2d 933, 939 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding diver did
not qualify as seaman even though he was on a vessel for 30% of his working time
only because of an usual period of employment due to injury); Landry, 299 F. Supp.
2d 629 (finding diver did not qualify as a seaman because he did not spend 30% of
time on board a vessel). See Pickle v. Int’l Oilfield Divers, Inc., 791 F.2d 1237, 1240
(5th Cir. 1986) (finding that because diver spent 90% of his working hours on board
a vessel, he qualified as a seaman). Other courts, however, have held that divers are
seamen even without 30% of work done on a vessel. Rather than focusing on the 30%
of time on a vessel requirement, these courts have examined whether the diver was
exposed to marine perils and was in service to a vessel or fleet of vessels. See, e.g.,
Pettis v. Bosarge Diving, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1230 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding
that the diver was a seaman because of the inherently maritime nature of his work and
that he worked in the service of the ship).
2. These facts are loosely derived from a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case,
Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984), though the facts have been
altered to illustrate the problem this Comment addresses. If its facts were the same as
here, Wallace would have been overruled by Alexander v. Express Energy Services
Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 2015); thus, these facts highlight the
problems for such workers if they were not assigned to the vessels.
3. Wallace was assigned to the vessels. Wallace, 727 F.2d at 430.
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months on the vessels, he is paid and then taken back to New Orleans for
a few weeks on land, where he works for Black Mud to maintain diving
equipment and perform other related tasks.
Two days after coming on board on the latest venture, George’s
supervisor instructs him to make an extremely deep and dangerous dive.4
During the dive, a cable snaps, and its recoil throws him to the ocean floor.5
The cable rolls back and strikes him in his back and shoulders, leaving him
dazed and injured.6 In response to this accident, George rises to his first
decompression stop, where he is put on an inadequate decompression
schedule.7 As a result, he contracts severe decompression sickness and, per
proper recompression procedure, must be placed in a recompression chamber
within five minutes.8 His supervisor causes a delay in the procedure that
results in George sustaining serious injuries, including a drop in his
intelligence quotient, debilitation of his motor faculties, double vision, and
depression.9 George wishes to bring a negligence action against his employer.
Additionally, George’s wife, Susan, desires to bring an action for loss of
consortium and other non-pecuniary losses.10 Their ability to bring these
actions depends upon whether George is classified as a seaman. This
Comment considers this question.
Accordingly, the couple’s attorney files a claim in the Eastern District
of Louisiana, and the litigation proceeds until Black Mud files a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of seaman status.11 Black Mud argues
4. Id. at 431.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In Wallace, the injured worker also complained of an occasional nervous
jerk and the permanent use of crutches. Id.
10. An action for loss of consortium is an action for loss of intimacy and
companionship in the marital relationship. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY
AND MARITIME LAW 168 (4th ed. 2004). These potential damages are not considered
pecuniary damages. Id. Because seamen and their spouses are only allowed to recover
pecuniary damages, the spouse of a seaman cannot sue for loss of consortium. Id. at
16970 (“[L]oss of consortium and society are recoverable under the general maritime
law except in actions by seamen against their employers and where the cause of action
is based on a statute that precludes such damages.”).
11. Seaman status is important because seamen are granted greater protections
than other marine workers and have an action under the Jones Act for negligence,
under which it is easier to prove causation than that under general maritime law.
Therefore, it is extremely beneficial in most instances for a worker to be a seaman
rather than another type of maritime employee. John W. deGravelles, Harbor Tug
& Barge Co. v. Papai: Another Turn in the Labyrinth?, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 209,
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that George cannot be a seaman because he did not spend 30% or more of
his working time12 aboard a vessel.13 The only time he was on board a
vessel was to store his equipment, eat, sleep, rest, or be transported to the
places of his employment. These tasks, Black Mud argues, should not
qualify as work on board a vessel for determining seaman status. The
Eastern District grants Black Mud’s motion to deny George seaman status,
following the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Alexander v.
Express Energy Operating Services, L.P.14
In Alexander, Michael Alexander worked on a fixed platform and was
injured by a piece of equipment rolling onto his foot.15 Alexander sued his
employer, Express Energy Operating Services, L.P. (“Express”), under the
Jones Act16 in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Eastern District granted
Express’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Alexander was not a
seaman.17 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
to qualify as a seaman per the second prong of Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,18 a
209 (1998) (listing these protections as maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and
a negligence action under the Jones Act); Andrew Hoang Do, Seaman Remedies
and Maritime Releases: A Practical Consideration, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 379 (1995);
see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v.
W. Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (D.P.R. 1986).
12. This time would be calculated by factoring in the number of days George
is employed by Black Mud. For instance, by this interpretation, if George is
employed for 100 days and works for 30 days on board a vessel, he would have
worked on board a vessel for 30% of the time.
13. Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036
(5th Cir. 2015) (holding that because Alexander did not work on board a vessel
for at least 30% of time, he was not a seaman).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018). “A seaman injured in the course
of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of
the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury,
against the employer.” Id. Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, a seaman could not
sue for negligence against his employer. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903);
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995). Congress passed the Act to fill
that gap in protection. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354.
17. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015).
18. The United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision on this issue,
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 357–68, delineated two prongs for seaman status: First,
an employee’s duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to
the accomplishment of its mission . . . . Second, . . . a seaman must have
a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.
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worker must have performed at least 30% of his work on a vessel or
identifiable fleet of vessels.19 Accordingly, workers who perform a
significant portion of their work on navigable waters, but not on board a
vessel, no longer qualify as seamen. In this way, the Fifth Circuit
misconstrued Chandris as requiring employees to do 30% of their work
aboard a vessel when, instead, Chandris identifies the purpose of the second
prong as distinguishing between those employees who are land-based and
those who are regularly exposed to marine perils.20 In Alexander, the court
used the United States Supreme Court’s language in Chandris to reach a
result that will eliminate some amphibious workers’21 seaman status.22 After
Alexander, workers like George who are regularly exposed to marine
perils,23 for which the Jones Act was passed,24 and who are “doing the ship’s
work”25 will not be afforded the protections of seaman status if they do not
work on board a vessel for 30% of the time. George, then, would not
necessarily lose his case for seaman status despite being exposed to marine
perils and doing the ship’s work.

(internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1036.
20. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36970 (“The fundamental purpose of this substantial
connection requirement is . . . to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are
entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a
transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose
employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.” (citing 1B A.
JENNER, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 11a (7th ed. 1994))).
21. Used primarily in the context of longshoremen, the term “amphibious
workers” refers to those maritime workers whose work takes place both on land
and over water. Here and elsewhere in this Comment, the term is used broadly.
22. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034 (reading Chandris as requiring a seaman to
work on board a vessel for 30% of the time).
23. A term of art in maritime law, “perils of the sea” refers to all perils that are
unique to navigable waters, such as rivers. See Jones v. Pitcher Co., 3 Stew & P. 135,
17677 (Ala. 1833). The term “marine perils” is used instead in this Comment to
reflect more accurately the term’s intent, which is any peril that occurs over water,
such as the dangers of a vessel capsizing, drowning, storms, dangerous wildlife,
among others. In a recent Fifth Circuit decision, the court noted that both workers who
are employed on “the quiet waters of a Potomac creek” and “the angry waves of the
Atlantic” are exposed to these marine perils. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744
F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481,
497 (2005)).
24. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 372 (majority opinion) (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)).
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Meanwhile, Alexander exposes employers to greater liability because
some of these non-seaman workers are able to bring general maritime tort
claims.26 For instance, in those limited situations in which the “dual
capacity”27 doctrine applies, workers like George may bring an action for
punitive damages against their employers,28 and spouses like Susan may
sue for loss of consortium;29 these actions are not available if the workers
qualify as seamen.30 Finally, the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s
jurisdiction are left with less discretion in cases in which the employee is
regularly exposed to marine perils by doing the ship’s work but is not
working on board a vessel for 30% of time.
To explore these issues, Part I of this Comment provides background
through a discussion of the evolution of seaman status—from the term’s
original meaning under maritime law to the current two-pronged test from
Chandris. It particularly focuses on the second prong of the United States
Supreme Court’s test. Part II of this Comment describes the facts, procedural
history, and reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Alexander, arguing that its
26. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390–91 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding that recovery for unseaworthiness under Jones Act or general
maritime law is limited to pecuniary losses, which does not include punitive
damages); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990) (holding that a
maritime cause of action for wrongful death does not include loss of society); see
also Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1992)
(extending Miles to deny punitive damages recovery to a seaman); Guevara v.
Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Atl. Sounding
Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424–25 (2009) (finding seaman is entitled to seek
punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure).
27. If the employer is also the vessel owner and acting in its capacity as vessel
owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in that capacity.
33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933 (2018). See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,
462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. App’x 143
(5th Cir. 2009).
28. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558 (1818) (stating that punitive
damages may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher
v. The Yankee, 9 Fed. Cas. 1091, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (finding that punitive
damages could be awarded against a vessel master who illegally transported the
plaintiff to the Sandwich Islands); see also In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d
89 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding punitive damages were not available); In re Complaint
of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that punitive
damages may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct).
29. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 16970.
30. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37 (holding in part that loss of consortium is not
included in an action under the Jones Act); McBride, 768 F.3d at 390–91 (holding
that non-pecuniary damages, such as punitive damages for unseaworthiness, are
not available to seamen).
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holding severely impacts and improperly limits seaman status. Part III of
this Comment presents solutions to these problems by suggesting a
preferred reading of Chandris, considering the ramifications of such a
reading on seaman status and the maritime industry. Part IV contains a
brief conclusion summarizing these solutions.
I. FROM “ONE WHO LIVES HIS LIFE UPON THE SEA”31 TO THE TWOPRONGED TEST
Maritime law has long recognized that the rights of seamen exceed those
of non-seamen.32 Whether workers have attained seaman status determines
the rights and remedies available to injured workers and informs employers
when making hiring decisions, defending against claims, and purchasing
insurance coverage.33 Seamen are distinguished from longshoremen34 and
general maritime workers,35 whose status and protections are notably
different.
In general, courts view seamen as “wards of the admiralty,”36 and their
rights are protected both through general maritime law and congressional
action in three separate but interconnected ways.37 First, seamen have the right
to recover maintenance and cure,38 which includes wages, cost of living, and
medical care owed to seamen “who become ill or injured while in service of

31. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934).
32. deGravelles, supra note 11.
33. See id.
34. Qualifying as such would grant them the protections of The Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2018). The
LHWCA defines those covered by the Act as “any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and
ship-breaker . . . .” § 902(3).
35. Qualifying as such, and not as seamen or longshoremen, would grant
them the standard of care owed after Kermerac v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
36. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (quoting Harden v.
Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 48385 (C.C.D. Me. 1823)).
37. See Edward M. Bull III, Seaman Status Revisited: A Practical Guide to
Status Determination, 6 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 547, 552 (1994) (describing these
protections as “the seaman’s remedial trident”).
38. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); see Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line,
Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 37071 (1932).
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a vessel”39 until they reach maximum medical improvement.40 Second,
seamen have a general maritime law claim for injuries incurred as a result
of the unseaworthiness41 of a vessel.42 Finally, seamen have an action
against their employer for negligence under the Jones Act.43 These actions
compose the “trilogy of heightened legal protections (unavailable to other
maritime workers) that seamen receive because of their exposure to the
‘perils of the sea.’”44 The law grants seamen greater protections than other
marine workers,45 and it is easier to prove causation under a Jones Act
action for negligence than under general maritime law.46 Therefore, it is
extremely beneficial in most instances for a worker to be a seaman rather
than another type of maritime employee.
Before 1920, general maritime law recognized only the first two of
these rights of action for seamen.47 Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, a
seaman could not sue for negligence against his employer;48 Congress
passed the Act to fill that gap in protection.49 Congress did not define
39. Jefferson v. Baywater Drilling, L.L.C., No. 14-1711, 2015 WL 365526,
at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015).
40. Id.
41. A vessel owner owes a duty to a seaman to keep the vessel and all its
appurtenances in a seaworthy condition. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. See
Cortes, 287 U.S. at 37071. To be in a “seaworthy condition” means to be in a
condition reasonably suitable and fit to be used for the purpose or use for which
the vessel was provided or intended. 8TH CIR. MODEL CIV. JURY INSTR. §§ 4.70,
17.12 (2017). An unseaworthy condition may result from lack of an adequate
crew, lack of adequate manpower to perform a particular task on the vessel, or
improper use of otherwise seaworthy equipment. §§ 4.70, 17.12.
42. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175; see also Cortes, 287 U.S. at 37071.
43. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018).
44. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (citing G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6–21, pp. 328–29 (2d ed. 1975)). In Naquin v.
Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 935 (5th Cir. 2014), the court discussed that
terms and phrases such as “perils of the sea,” “sea-based,” and “sea-based duties”
should not be understood literally. Rather, “we have dozens of cases finding oilfield
workers and other ‘brown-water’ workers on drilling barges and other vessels
qualified as seamen even though they spent all their work time on these vessels
submerged in quiet inland canals and waterways.” Naquin, 744 F.3d at 935.
45. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 209 (listing these protections as maintenance
and cure, unseaworthiness, and a negligence action under the Jones Act).
46. Hoang Do, supra note 11, at 388; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702
F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. W. Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023,
1025 (D.P.R. 1986).
47. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354.
48. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354.
49. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354.
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“seaman” in the Jones Act,50 and initially, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress intended to include all workers who fell within the established
meaning under general maritime law: “a seaman is a mariner of any
degree, one who lives his life upon the sea.”51 Congress later gave context
to the Jones Act definition of “seaman” when it passed the Longshore and
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).52 The LHWCA
provides coverage to a variety of land-based workers but excludes from
coverage “a master or member of a crew of any vessel.”53
The Court interpreted this exclusion to mean that the definition of
“seaman” in the Jones Act should be “a master or member of a crew of
any vessel.”54 Thus, the Jones Act and LHWCA are mutually exclusive,55
and now, the essential requirement for Jones Act coverage appears in
another statute.56 For classic seamen—those workers who are assigned
permanently to a vessel or fleet of vessels and spend all of their working
time on board a vessel on navigable water—the question of seaman status
is no question at all. For amphibious workers, however, the question
remains more difficult. Notwithstanding this clarification of “seaman” in
the Jones Act, the determination of seaman status remains challenging.57
A. The Lower Courts’ First Formulations
In 1941, the First Circuit Court of Appeals developed the first
jurisprudential test for seaman status.58 In Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co.,
the court held that the test contained the following elements: that (1) the
vessel on which the seaman served be in navigation; (2) the worker have
a more or less permanent connection with the vessel; and (3) the worker
be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.59 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted this formulation60 but modified the “more or less
50. Id. at 355; The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018).
51. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 15759 (1934).
52. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902
(2018).
53. § 902(3)(G); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355.
54. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991) (citing §
902(3)(G)).
55. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 35556.
56. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 347; § 902; The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §§
30104–30106 (2018). See Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
57. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 358; deGravelles, supra note 11, at 210.
58. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 99495 (1st Cir. 1941).
59. Id.
60. See Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975).
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permanent connection”61 language and, instead, required a connection that
was “substantial in terms of its . . . duration and . . . nature.”62
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals tried a different tack in Offshore Co.
v. Robison.63 In its holding, the court abandoned the traditional navigation
requirement and devised two elements for seaman status: (1) the worker
must be assigned permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his
work thereon; and (2) the worker’s employment must contribute to the
function of the vessel and the accomplishment of its mission, maintenance,
or anchorage for future trips.64 After Robison, the Fifth Circuit modified its
rule to include a worker who was employed on an “identifiable fleet” of
vessels.65 Then, in Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., the court added a
“temporal gloss” to the requirements and began to require substantial time
spent on board a vessel.66 Since Barrett, the court, as a “rule of thumb,”
required that at least 30% of an amphibious worker’s employment time be
spent working on board a vessel for that worker to qualify as a seaman.67
Until Chandris, the other lower federal courts all required at least “a
significant connection to a vessel in navigation,”68 but all remained divided
on the test for seaman status.69
B. The Supreme Court Drops Anchor to Weigh in on Seaman Status
Attempting to resolve this conflict among the lower courts, the
Supreme Court decided four cases on seaman status between 1991 and
1997.70 The first, McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, concerned a worker

61. Carumbo, 123 F.2d at 995.
62. Salgado, 514 F.2d at 755.
63. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
64. Id.
65. Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960).
66. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 366 (1995) (discussing Barrett v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
67. Id. at 367 (1995) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has consistently required
about 30% of a worker’s time to be spent on board a vessel).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 99495 (1st Cir.
1941); Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975); Robison,
266 F.2d at 779.
70. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 211; McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337 (1991) (holding that to be a seaman, the worker must be doing the
ship’s work); Sw. Marine v. Gizoni, 520 U.S. 81 (1991) (holding that seaman status
could not be denied to a maritime worker merely because his occupation fell within
the parameters of the LHWCA); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363; Harbor Tug & Barge Co.
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who failed to aid in the navigational function of the vessels on which he
served.71 Wilander was a paint foreman who was injured when a pressurized
pipe exploded on the fixed platform where he was working.72 He brought an
action for Jones Act negligence.73 The Supreme Court granted Wilander
seaman status, deciding that aiding in a vessel’s navigation was not
necessarily required to qualify as a seaman.74 The Court held, instead, that
to be seamen, workers must be “doing the ship’s work”75 by “contribut[ing]
to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.”76 The
Court concluded that the employees’ jobs were not determinative; rather,
their connection to a vessel was the determinative factor.77
In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, the Court addressed the nature of that
connection, using a “status-based standard”78 to determine whether workers
were fundamentally land-based or sea-based.79 The Court emphasized that
lower courts should not look at a mere “snapshot” of the work of the
employees; rather, courts should look at the employees’ overall connection to
a vessel or fleet of vessels.80 The Chandris Court then partially followed the
test from Robison81 and delineated two requirements for seaman status. First,
an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the function of the vessel
or to the accomplishment of its mission . . . . Second . . . a seaman

v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997) (holding that the identifiable group of vessels
requirement needed the element of common ownership or control).
71. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. 337.
72. Id. at 339.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 347; see also Christine M. Gimeno, Persons and Employments
within Act, 78A C.J.S. SEAMEN § 203 (2016).
75. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 355.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 35354; see also deGravelles, supra note 11, at 212.
78. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 358 (1995); see also deGravelles,
supra note 11, at 212.
79. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363.
80. Id. (citing Easley v. S. Shipbuilding Corp., 965 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1050 (1993)).
81. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that
there are two elements for seaman status: that (1) the worker must be assigned
permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his work thereon; and (2)
the worker’s employment must contribute to the function of the vessel, the
accomplishment of its mission, its maintenance, or anchorage for future trips). In
this way, the Supreme Court only partially adopted the rule because the
requirement of work on board a vessel is missing from the Chandris holding.
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.
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must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable
group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration
and its nature.82
Addressing the second prong, the Chandris Court directed the lower courts
to stress that “the Jones Act was intended to protect sea-based maritime
workers, who owe their allegiance to a vessel [or fleet of vessels], and not
land-based employees, who do not.”83
The Court also partially adopted the Fifth Circuit’s rule about mixed
employment: generally, to qualify as seamen, workers must spend about
30% of their time “in the service of a vessel in navigation.”84 The Court in
Chandris emphasized that this rule is relevant only in the context of mixed
employment workers like George;85 the rule is irrelevant when a worker is
permanently assigned to a vessel-based or land-based position because in
that case the court can determine seaman status based on the permanent
employment status of the worker.86 In the case of mixed employment, the
Court noted that seaman status is a “fact specific” inquiry,87 and lower
courts have the flexibility to consider the circumstances surrounding the
worker’s employment when applying the rule.88
On the other hand, even before the Supreme Court decided Chandris,
the Fifth Circuit was interpreting the “substantial connection”89 requirement
as time spent working on a vessel rather than merely in the service of that
vessel.90 In Barrett, the court addressed a case in which a worker spent
82. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. Post-Chandris, the Supreme Court ruled that
for a worker who works on an “identifiable group of . . . vessels” to qualify as a
seaman, the vessels must be subject to “common ownership or control.” Harbor
Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 556 (1997).
83. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. In Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d
927, 935 (5th Cir. 2015), the court discussed that terms and phrases like “sea-based”
and “sea-based duties” should not be understood literally. Rather, “we have dozens of
cases finding oilfield workers and other ‘brown-water’ workers on drilling barges and
other vessels qualified as seamen even though they spent all their work time on these
vessels submerged in quiet inland canals and waterways.” Naquin, 744 F.3d at 935.
84. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 375.
90. See, e.g., Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 107374 (5th
Cir. 1986) (en banc); Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 669 F.2d
350, 353 (5th Cir. 1982); Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 484
(5th Cir. 1976).
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most of his time on an oil platform and performed only incidental work on
an adjacent vessel.91 The Barrett court relied on its earlier case, Robison, in
which it held that for workers to qualify as seamen, they must either be
permanently assigned to a vessel or perform a substantial portion of their
work thereon.92 The Fifth Circuit has continued to use this interpretation,
even using the language in Chandris93 to strengthen its argument that
seaman status requires workers to spend at least 30% of their working time
on a vessel to qualify as Jones Act seamen.94 The Fifth Circuit’s influence
cannot be understated—the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Fifth
Circuit’s decisions when deciding Chandris, including partially adopting
the Fifth Circuit’s test for seaman status.95 The Supreme Court further
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rule because of that court’s “years of
experience” with the issue.96 The Fifth Circuit’s influence on the Supreme
Court in maritime issues, as illustrated in the Supreme Court’s adoption of
the Robison rule, also explains why the recent decision in Alexander is
significant. The Alexander “on board a vessel” interpretation eventually
may be adopted by the Supreme Court and become binding law in all
jurisdictions.
II. ALEXANDER V. EXPRESS ENERGY SERVICES, L.P.: A CHANGE IN COURSE
The Fifth Circuit applied its interpretation of the Chandris two-pronged
test to the facts of Alexander.97 Michael Alexander worked for Express, an
oilfield services company for well construction and well testing services,98
as a lead hand in the company’s plug and abandonment (“P&A”)
department.99 The department worked to plug decommissioned oil wells on
platforms off the coast of Louisiana.100 Alexander’s duties included
supervising workers and ensuring that each operation was running smoothly
91. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1068–70.
92. Id. at 1073 (citing Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)).
93. “A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service
of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act . . . .”
Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir.
2015) (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371).
94. Id.
95. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 369.
96. Id. at 371.
97. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1035.
98. Company Overview of Express Energy Services, L.P., BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=33
041463 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CS4B-VPTW].
99. Id.
100. Id.
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and completed successfully.101 Significantly, he was never assigned to a
specific platform or vessel, and the lift boats that he used were owned by
Aries Marine Corporation, a company working with Express.102 On
August 11, 2011, Alexander was working on a P&A project on a platform
containing four wells.103 A lift boat was next to the platform with a catwalk
connecting the boat to the platform.104 Alexander was working on the
platform when a wireline from a crane on the lift boat snapped, causing a
bridge plug and tool combination to fall and injure him.105
A. Procedural History and the Parties’ Arguments
Alexander filed an action under the Jones Act against Express and
other defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana, arguing that Express
was negligent.106 Express filed a motion for summary judgment on seaman
status, asserting that, as a platform-based worker, Alexander could not be
a seaman.107 Express further argued that Alexander failed to satisfy either
prong of Chandris because he neither “contribute[d] to the function of a
vessel or the accomplishment of its mission because he worked on the
wells on non-vessel fixed platforms”108 nor worked on a vessel for 30% of
his employment time.109 The court found the fact that 35% of Alexander’s
jobs involved the use of a lift boat to be insufficient.110 Instead, Express
argued that because Alexander did not spend 30% of his total employment
time physically on board the lift boat, he should not qualify as a seaman
under the second prong of Chandris.111 Alexander argued that “he . . .
contribute[d] to the function of the Aries liftboat” so as to satisfy the first
Chandris prong.112 He also wrongly asserted that he spent 35% of time on
the Aries lift boats, though Express conceded that at least 35% of his time
involved the use of the lift boats.113
101. Id.
102. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015).
103. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., 784 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th
Cir. 2015).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1035–36.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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The Eastern District granted Express’s motion for summary
judgment,114 finding that Alexander did not satisfy the requirements for
seaman status under the first prong of Chandris because his duties related
to the fixed platform, not the vessel.115 The fact that Alexander engaged in
various activities on board the lift boat, such as eating, sleeping, relaxing,
storing his tools, and loading and unloading materials was not enough to
qualify as seaman’s work under the first Chandris prong.116 In a footnote,
the court stated that Alexander also had failed to satisfy the second
prong.117
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning and Interpretation of Chandris
On appeal, the principal issue before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
was whether the district court erred in granting Express’s motion for
summary judgment on seaman status or if the facts were such that the
question should have gone to the jury.118 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
Eastern District’s decision on other grounds, focusing on the second prong
of Chandris to determine whether Alexander qualified as a seaman.119 The
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 2014 WL 1763172
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015).
117. Id. at *4 n.6. The court in Alexander stated that Alexander’s activities on
the boats did not qualify for the 30% of working time:
In Hufnagel, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff had no connection
to the lift boat at issue, having never been on it before the job on which
he was injured and having no expectation to ever return to that specific
vessel, and that he had no connection with any other identifiable fleet of
vessels . . . . Here, Alexander offers no evidence that he had ever been
assigned to the L/B RAM X [the lift boat] before or that he would in the
future . . . . He was never assigned to a specific platform or vessel. None
of the lift boats used by Alexander were owned or operated by Express,
rather it was Express’s customers that contracted for the lift boats.
Id.
118. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1032. The Supreme Court stated in Chandris that
summary judgment was appropriate in a determination of seaman status only
“where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate
connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the question from the jury
by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
515 U.S. 347, 371 (1995).
119. The Fifth Circuit essentially disregarded the first Chandris prong and
addressed whether Alexander satisfied the second prong (discussing whether
Alexander had “a connection to a vessel in navigation . . . that [was] substantial
in terms of both its duration and its nature”). Alexander, 784 F.3d at 103637.
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court held that because Alexander failed to satisfy this second prong and
did not qualify as a seaman, the issue did not need to go to a jury.120 Based
on the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Chandris requires at least 30% of an
employee’s work to occur on board a vessel.121 Consequently, the court
required that Alexander must have spent 30% or more of his working time
on board either the lift boat or Express’s main vessel to qualify as a
seaman.122 The fact that Alexander worked merely in connection with the
lift boats for 30% of his time was insufficient to meet the test for seaman
status; as a result, the court found that summary judgment was proper.123
Under the facts in Alexander, the Fifth Circuit correctly found that
Alexander had not satisfied the test for seaman status. Alexander had not
spent 30% of working time on board a vessel to satisfy the two Chandris
prongs because his work was performed in connection to the platforms and
not a vessel. But the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed because it ignores
and misstates important language in Chandris regarding the appropriate
test for seaman status, leading to a result that will prove detrimental to the
courts and the maritime community. Instead of the Fifth Circuit’s rigid “on
board a vessel” interpretation, the test for seaman status should more
accurately conform to the holding in Chandris and the purpose of the Jones
Act: (1) whether the employee is “[doing] the ship’s work”124 to satisfy the
first prong of Chandris;125 and (2) whether the employee is regularly
exposed to marine perils for the requisite 30% of time to satisfy both the
nature and duration elements of the second prong of Chandris.126
III. ALEXANDER: A RIGID RULE WITH UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES
Rather than providing clarity in this murky area of maritime law, the
Fifth Circuit further muddled the issue in Alexander. The Alexander
holding complicates the issue of seaman status for courts and frustrates the
interests of maritime employees and employers. The Fifth Circuit in
Alexander interpreted the second prong of Chandris as applying the “on
board a vessel” requirement that workers be employed strictly on a vessel
for 30% of their working time to be seamen.127 In fact, Chandris requires
120. Id. at 1037.
121. Id. at 1034; Chandris, 515 U.S. 347.
122. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034.
123. Id.
124. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498
U.S. 337, 355 (1991)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1037.
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that the worker be both working in the service “of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission”128 and have a “connection to [a] vessel . .
. that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.”129 Express and
Alexander’s opposing arguments in Alexander highlight the crux of the
argument surrounding the exact meaning of the second prong.130
A. How the Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted Chandris
The Fifth Circuit stated in Alexander that the Chandris Court applied
its rule from Robison,131 and, therefore, the second prong requires work on
board a vessel.132 Chandris, however, neither requires workers to be
assigned to a vessel nor to spend 30% of their time working on board a
vessel.133 Addressing the second prong, the Chandris Court held that the
worker’s connection to a vessel must be substantial in duration and
nature.134 The Supreme Court discussed how work on board a vessel could
lead to a finding of seaman status: “‘[i]f it can be shown that the employee
performed a significant part of his work on board the vessel on which he
was injured, with at least some degree of regularity and continuity, the test
for seaman status will be satisfied.’”135 The underlying purpose of the
substantial connection prong, however, is to separate sea-based maritime
employees who regularly are exposed to marine perils from land-based
workers who are not as sufficiently connected to a vessel.136 This purpose
represents the spirit of the second prong. Rather than interpreting Chandris
to require work on board a vessel, the lower courts should interpret the
case to require work in service of a vessel as the first prong of the test for
seaman status, paired with regular contact with marine perils for 30% of
working time as the second prong of the test.
The Fifth Circuit should clarify its decision by attempting to adhere
more closely to Chandris. The Fifth Circuit and other lower courts should
128. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (citing McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 355).
129. Id.
130. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing that although Express argued
that Alexander had to be working on board a vessel for 30% of time, Alexander
argued that he had to be in service of a vessel for 30% of time).
131. The rule requires a worker to be either permanently assigned or perform
a substantial amount of work on the vessel to qualify as a seaman. Offshore Co.
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
132. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034.
133. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376.
134. Id. at 375.
135. Id. at 36869 (quoting JENNER, supra note 20, § 11a).
136. Id. at 368.
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follow Chandris and emphasize that the second prong reserves the Jones
Act remedy for employees whose work regularly exposes them to “the
special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in
ships are subjected.”137 Not only is this distinction emphasized in
Chandris,138 but it also stresses the purpose of seaman status and avoids
the test for that status from becoming a test in itself.139 In determining the
Jones Act coverage qualifications, the Court “focus[ed] upon the essence
of what it means to be a seaman and . . . eschew[ed] the temptation to
create detailed tests . . . that tend to become ends in and of themselves.”140
A rigid requirement that disregards the purpose of seaman status is an “end
in and of [itself]”141 that does not accurately reflect the reality of modern
maritime law.142
In actuality, seamen are employees whose work takes place in the
service of a vessel; consequently, they are exposed to marine perils in the
course and scope of their employment that should warrant their protection
under the Jones Act, even if those employees do not work on board a vessel
for 30% of time.143 For instance, George and workers like him who do not
work on board a vessel for 30% of their employment nevertheless are
doing the ship’s work when, as in the hypothetical, the vessel’s function is
to transport them to the rigs to work as well as to provide a platform from
which the divers can store their diving and monitoring equipment and
receive help from other workers still on the vessel.144 Diving and
performing related tasks should qualify as doing the ship’s work because
the mission of the vessel is to bring the diver to the site and serve as a
platform. The fact that these workers are exposed to the same perils as
classic seamen for a substantial period,145 coupled with the fact that they
are doing the ship’s work, should classify them as seamen despite not
working on a vessel for that time period. If courts keep the purpose of the

137. Id. at 370 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)). See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927,
934 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing how these dangers apply also in brown-water
situations in which the worker is not strictly at sea).
138. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 369.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 376.
143. Id. at 378.
144. See Introduction supra p. 2.
145. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014)
(discussing how these dangers apply also in brown-water situations in which the
worker is not strictly at sea).
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Jones Act in mind,146 they should find seaman status for employees who do
not qualify under the Alexander Court’s “on board a vessel” interpretation.147
This interpretation more closely aligns with the central purpose of the Jones
Act and is preferable to the Fifth Circuit’s misinterpretation, which will bar
those latter employees from the Act’s protection.
1. How the Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted Chandris Dicta Concerning
“On Board a Vessel”
When deciding Alexander, the Fifth Circuit cited to specific language
in Chandris in support of its conclusion that Alexander could not qualify
as a seaman because he did not work 30% of time on board a vessel.148
Though it may appear as if the Supreme Court intended the substantial
connection prong to require time spent working on a vessel,149 the Court
did not require work literally on board a vessel when determining its test
for seaman status.150 The language in Chandris cited by the Fifth Circuit
originated from A. Jenner, Benedict on Admiralty,151 in which the writer
discussed that “if it can be shown that the employee performed a
significant part of his work onboard the vessel on which he was injured,
with at least some degree of regularity and continuity, the test for seaman
status will be satisfied.”152 The Fifth Circuit also cited language which
emphasized that if a worker’s duties take place on board a vessel for only
a fraction of time, the worker is land-based and not a seaman.153 The Fifth
Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s citation of this language as the
Court’s adoption of its own rule derived from Robison and its progeny,
which required a worker to work on board a vessel for at least 30% of time
to be a seaman.154
Under the second prong of Chandris, however, “the worker must have
a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels)
that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”155 If the
Supreme Court intended this prong to require working on board a vessel,
146. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.
147. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1034
(5th Cir. 2015).
148. Id. (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36871).
149. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36869.
150. Id. at 376.
151. Id. at 36869 (citing JENNER, supra note 20, § 11a, pp. 2-10.1 to 2-11).
152. Id.
153. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034 (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371).
154. Id.
155. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376.
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that language would have been simple to include, as the Fifth Circuit did
in Robison and subsequent cases.156 Instead, the Supreme Court articulated
the Fifth’s Circuit’s rule of thumb for the ordinary case: “ A worker who
spends less than about 30% of his time in the service of a vessel in
navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.”157 The
Supreme Court used the language “in the service of a vessel”158 rather than
“on board a vessel.”159 By refusing to adopt the “on board a vessel”
language, the Supreme Court did not intend to require that 30% of
employees’ working time be spent on a vessel.
The Court notes that the purpose of the second prong is to distinguish
between land-based workers and sea-based workers who are subjected to
the kinds of maritime dangers as classic seamen.160 Though working on
board a vessel is the classic nature of a seaman’s work, the Court notes
that seamen are those maritime employees whose work “regularly
expose[s] [them] to the perils of the sea.”161 Working on board a vessel is
one way that the worker may be subjected to these marine perils, but it is
not the only way. George, for example, faces these same perils during his
employment, but he is not working on board a vessel for the requisite
period. Because he faces these perils for 30% of time, George and others
like him should qualify as seamen. If the workers are regularly exposed to
these perils for 30% of their working time, thus satisfying the “nature” and
“duration” elements, the second prong of Chandris is satisfied. It does not
follow that the Court’s citation of the quote from Jenner, Benedict on
Admiralty should be understood to require 30% of work to be done on
board a vessel. This misinterpretation of the Chandris language will lead
to unwelcome consequences in the lower courts and to maritime
employers and employees.

156. See, e.g., Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Barrett
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1073–74 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 669 F.2d 350, 353 (5th Cir.
1982) (“To perform a substantial part of his work aboard a vessel, it must be
shown that he performed a significant part of his work aboard the vessel with at
least some degree of regularity and continuity.”); Holland v. Allied Structural
Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]e have continued to analyze the
question of seaman status by focusing on . . . the time spent aboard or in the service
of a vessel . . . .”).
157. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034.
160. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36872.
161. Id. at 368.
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IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THESE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES
The Alexander court’s holding, which ignored the purpose of the Jones
Act and misconstrued the language of Chandris, presents two main
problems. First, the lower courts are faced with less discretion in cases,
like George’s, that demand such discretion. Second, the decision creates
practical problems for employees and employers when determining status
and coverage, problems that could expose employers, in some limited but
important circumstances, to greater liability in general maritime tort.
A. Alexander’s Consequences in the Lower Courts
Because of the “on board a vessel” reading of the Chandris two-prong
test, the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction have less
discretion in determining seaman status.162 This lack of discretion is
especially problematic in cases in which the nature of the employees’ work
and their exposure to marine perils should warrant seaman status, but these
employees have not spent 30% of their working time on board a vessel.
For instance, though a court could determine that George should qualify
as a seaman because he is doing the ship’s work and is exposed to maritime
dangers for 30% of his working time,163 it cannot grant seaman status after
Alexander. George does not perform his work on board a vessel; instead,
his working time takes place off the vessel. After Alexander, his time
exposed to marine perils cannot be counted in the 30% of time calculation.
To avoid this problem, courts should follow the spirit of Chandris and
consider the nature of employees’ work in the service of a vessel and their
exposure to marine perils, regardless of whether their work is physically
on board that vessel, in determining whether the employees meet the
requisite 30% of working time on board a vessel.
When the Chandris Court discussed the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rule, it
noted that although “departure from [the rule] will certainly be justified in
appropriate cases,”164 the general rule arose because of “years of
experience.”165 The Alexander “on board a vessel” requirement misapplies
the 30% rule by not allowing the courts to consider off-vessel work in the
service of the vessel where the worker is exposed to marine perils. 166
Instead, the Alexander requirement necessitates that the courts look only
at “on the vessel” work rather than at the nature of employees’ work, that
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Cf. Gimeno, supra note 74, § 203.
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id. at 372 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)).
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is, work for the vessel that exposes them to marine perils. Further,
Alexander ignores the Chandris language “in the service of a vessel”167
and instead applies the language “on board a vessel”168 to create a more
rigid rule that takes away the courts’ discretion. This lack of discretion
may appear to make ruling on summary judgment easier,169 but applying
this rigid rule ultimately will be more challenging without further guidance
on the definition of work “on a vessel.”170 Further, the Alexander rule will
prove fatal to cases like George’s, in which a worker spends a significant
portion of his time exposed to marine perils in the service of a vessel or
accomplishment of its mission.
In response to this issue, the “on board a vessel” requirement from
Alexander should be clarified by the Fifth Circuit.171 One way to improve
this requirement is to apply a different methodology to the nature and the
duration elements of the prong. This approach would allow courts to look
collectively at the nature and duration of work done while exposed to
classic marine dangers when factoring in the seaman’s connection to a
vessel. If an employee like George is doing work to “contribut[e] to the
function of a vessel or accomplishment of its mission,” and George is
regularly exposed to those typical seaman perils, his work should count in
the 30% of time calculation.172 Another way to remedy this issue is to limit
the Alexander holding to those cases in which a worker does more work

167. Id. at 369.
168. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036
(5th Cir. 2015).
169. David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, 40 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343, 400 (2016). But see Hurst v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
2015 WL 4397136 (E.D. La. July 16, 2015) (declining to grant summary
judgment on seaman status); Pellegrin v. Monto Oilfield Contractors, L.L.C.,
2015 WL 3651159 (E.D. La. June 11, 2015) (ruling that there were other issues
of fact that precluded summary judgment).
170. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1036; see infra discussion Part IV.B.1.
171. This Comment does not advocate for Alexander to be overruled. The Fifth
Circuit likely decided Alexander correctly even without changing the Chandris
language because Alexander worked very little in the service of the lift boats or
the main vessel. Id. Instead, this Comment argues that the “on board a vessel”
requirement be clarified so as to either only apply to Alexander’s factual
circumstances or that it should be only one of the ways in which, in this factintensive methodology, courts can find seaman status.
172. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.
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on land or a fixed platform173 than on navigable waters, thus not extending
the holding to all amphibious workers.
Because the courts could consider the work employees perform while
consistently in contact with marine perils, rather than merely the amount
of work they perform on a vessel, courts could find seaman status for
employees like George who do not perform 30% of work strictly on a
vessel. This interpretation would ensure that workers employed in the
service of a vessel and exposed to marine perils rightly qualify as seamen.
If Alexander were limited to its facts, this limitation would allow for the
courts’ discretion in deciding whether to grant summary judgment while
leaving the rigid rule from Alexander intact. Without either this revised
interpretation or limitation of Alexander, these workers for whom the
Jones Act was passed will be barred from seaman protections.174
1. Uniformity and Judicial Efficiency versus Discretion in the Lower
Courts
Although it may appear as though discretion in the courts creates
problems for maritime law, which at its core strives to maintain
uniformity,175 the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rigid requirement conflicts with the
purpose of the Jones Act. The Supreme Court in Chandris noted that the
federal courts were divided in determining the proper test for seaman
status,176 particularly in addressing the second prong of the Robison test.177
Creating a bright-line rule, which eliminates this division among the
courts, seems to fulfill this purpose. It will be easier for the courts to grant
summary judgment,178 the goal of which is judicial efficiency.179 With this
principal concern in mind, this “on a vessel” rule could be an ostensible
step toward furthering uniformity and consistency in maritime law.

173. See Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999)
(ruling that employee who worked on a fixed platform was not a seaman).
174. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36970 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)). See Naquin v. Elevating Boats,
L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing how these dangers apply
also in brown-water situations in which the worker is not strictly at sea).
175. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
176. See, e.g., Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941);
Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975); Offshore Co.
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
177. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 366.
178. Gimeno, supra note 74, § 203.
179. Summary Judgment, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.
2005) (“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials.”).
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Although a court-led effort in creating a bright-line rule would be
beneficial, the purpose of the Jones Act is to benefit injured employees.180
To protect the interests of these employees, the courts should weigh the
factual circumstances concerning the worker’s connection to a vessel in
determining whether the worker is a seaman.181 The question of seaman
status is a mixed question of law and fact,182 and the Supreme Court stated
in Chandris that only “where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime
worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in
navigation, the court may take the question from the jury by granting
summary judgment or a directed verdict.”183 When evaluating a case for
seaman status, the courts should apply a fact-intensive inquiry to both the
nature and duration elements of the worker’s employment rather than
merely addressing whether the employee’s work occurred on board a
vessel.
Particularly in close cases, there are underlying questions of fact
concerning the nature of the workers’ employment and their connection to
a vessel. If the employee regularly faces marine perils for 30% of time and
the nature of the employee’s work is in the service of a vessel, then the
court should deny summary judgment on seaman status and submit the
issue to the jury. If a judge decides the case based only on the Alexander
“on board a vessel” requirement without considering other facts and
circumstances, then summary judgment has been improperly granted.
These facts and circumstances should include the question of whether the
employee’s work on navigable waters satisfies the nature element, that is,
whether the worker is regularly exposed to marine perils, and whether the
worker has been employed for 30% of time in the service of a vessel to
satisfy the duration element of the second prong. Because the purpose of
the Jones Act is to protect the rights of workers exposed to classic maritime
dangers,184 the goal of uniformity and appeal of a bright-line rule for
judicial efficiency should not justify depriving these workers the
protections of seaman status.

180. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 372 (majority opinion) (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498
U.S. 337, 356 (1991)) (asserting that the test for seaman status is fact-intensive).
182. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 356; Chandris, 515 U.S. at 369; In re
Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Harbor Tug &
Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554 (1997)).
183. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371.
184. Id. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Alexander’s Consequences for Employees and Employers
Finally, Alexander creates practical problems when determining
employees’ status and coverage. The extent of the Alexander holding is
unclear and may apply only to employees like Alexander or to a larger
group of amphibious workers. Employees will be unsure whether they
qualify as seamen when attempting to sue for injuries. When employees
and employers attempt to determine seaman status in a lawsuit, both will
need to determine whether sufficient time has been spent working on a
vessel. To accomplish this task, they must understand what it means to do
work on a vessel. In short, the nature or duration elements of the second
Chandris prong have not been clarified for either employees or employers.
This decision in Alexander further frustrates the interests of employers,185
as the inapplicability of the Jones Act to their employees exposes them to
greater liability.186
1. What “Work on Board a Vessel” Means
The Alexander decision will cause employees and employers to
question whether employees’ work qualifies as work on board a vessel.
The Alexander Court complicated the question in its finding that eating
and sleeping in the lift boat, as well as loading and unloading materials
from the lift boat, did not qualify as work on board the vessel.187 These
remaining questions will cause employees concern and create further
tensions between employers and employees, potentially erupting in
lawsuits over coverage and status. If the purpose of the Jones Act is to

185. Though this Comment focuses on the uncertainty and greater liability this
Alexander decision creates, there could be other ramifications that are outside the
scope of this Comment. For instance, employers may have to purchase more
liability insurance, the costs of litigation may be greater, employees’ fees may
change depending on their status, among other things. These issues may arise as
the unfortunate ramifications of Alexander continue to ripple outward.
186. See Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1992) (extending Miles to deny loss of society damages to a seaman in an injury
case); Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated
by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424–25 (2009) (finding seaman
is entitled to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay
maintenance and cure, not for Jones Act negligence); McBride v. Estis Well Serv.,
L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015);
see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170.
187. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015).
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protect maritime workers who are “exposed to the perils of the sea,”188 the
Act should protect workers who are exposed constantly to potential injury
or death doing the ship’s work, even if they are not on board a vessel for
30% of their employment. Commercial divers like George are the
paradigmatic example189 because very little of their work takes place on
board a vessel.190 Yet even those workers who are on board a vessel for
less than 30% of time may be employed in work that exposes them to
marine perils for a temporally significant period.191 Nonetheless, if an
employee does not work on board a vessel for that period, regardless of
the nature of their work or their exposure to marine perils, that employee
will be precluded from enjoying seaman status after Alexander.
Employees should not have to contend with a rule that has the potential
to deprive them of seaman status. Classic seamen, who work on board a
vessel for the clear majority of their employment, will not experience the
effects of this rule, nor will those employees who are obviously land-based
and are only incidentally on vessels. But Alexander will prove fatal to
seaman status for amphibious employees who are not employed on a
vessel for the requisite time—like George the diver. Obviously, however,
these workers should be “sea-based”192 employees for purposes of
receiving Jones Act protections.193 The employees’ work on navigable
waters should count toward the 30% of time calculation—not only because
they are exposed to marine perils for which the Jones Act was passed but
also because they are working in the service of a vessel or accomplishment
of its mission, even when not literally on board the vessel. The Alexander
holding requires clarification to determine what qualifies as work on board
a vessel and the breadth of the decision.
188. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 358.
189. Independent pilots are another example; although they may work in the
service of a vessel or fleet of vessels every day to easily satisfy the first prong of
Chandris, they do not necessarily work on board a vessel for 30% of their
employment. See Bach v. Trident S.S. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted and remanded, 500 U.S. 949 (1991). Nevertheless, they are regularly
exposed to marine perils for which seaman’s protections exist.
190. John R. Hillsman, Have All the Recent Twists and Turns in the Jones Act
Left Deep Sea Divers High and Dry?, 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 47, 62–63 (1999).
191. Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 436 (5th Cir.1984) (“A
diver's work necessarily involves exposure to numerous marine perils, and is
inherently maritime because it cannot be done on land.”).
192. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363; see Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744
F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481,
497 (2005)) (illustrating that “sea-based” should not be taken literally, and applies
in brown-water situations).
193. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376.
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2. Greater Liability in Tort for Employers Under Alexander
The Alexander decision at first glance appears to benefit employers,
who no doubt will welcome the decision in Alexander for a variety of
reasons. First, the decision helps employers to determine which of their
employees are Jones Act seamen by creating a bright-line rule that is easy
to apply. This rule makes it harder for at least some amphibious workers
to qualify as seamen. It is advantageous for an employee to qualify as a
seaman because seamen are granted protections that other marine workers
are not,194 in addition to having the ability to bring a Jones Act action for
negligence that employs an easier burden of proof for causation than
general maritime law.195 The Alexander interpretation appears to limit
employers’ Jones Act liability from those workers who will no longer
qualify as seamen. Although seamen are usually given greater protection
under the Jones Act, in certain limited instances the Jones Act minimizes
employers’ liability.196 This limitation of liability is particularly applicable
in the context of certain non-pecuniary damages, such as claims for loss
of society, loss of consortium, and punitive damages.
Courts have ruled that under the Jones Act, the spouse of an injured
seaman cannot sue for loss of society or loss of consortium.197 Thus, if
George qualified as a seaman, Susan could not bring an action for loss of
society or consortium against Black Mud. Further, seamen themselves are
precluded from recovering certain kinds of non-pecuniary damages,

194. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 209 (listing these protections as maintenance
and cure, unseaworthiness, and a negligence action under the Jones Act).
195. Hoang Do, supra note 11, at 386; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702
F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. West Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp.
1023, 1025 (D.P.R. 1986).
196. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390–91 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding that recovery for unseaworthiness under Jones Act or general maritime
law is limited to pecuniary losses, which does not include punitive damages); Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990) (holding that a maritime cause of action
for wrongful death does not include loss of society); see also Murray v. Anthony J.
Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (extending Miles to deny loss of
society damages to a seaman in an injury case); Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59
F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S.
404 (2009) (seaman is entitled to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure
to pay maintenance and cure, not for Jones Act negligence).
197. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37 (holding that a maritime cause of action for
wrongful death does not include loss of society); Butler v. Ingram Barge Co., 2015
WL 1517438, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2015).
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including punitive damages, against their employer.198 If these workers are
not covered under the Jones Act, then they typically will be covered
exclusively under the LHWCA and will have no tort remedy against their
employers.199 For cases in which an employer owns the vessels on which
workers are injured and workers are injured by vessel negligence, however,
the dual capacity doctrine may apply.200 These workers, like George, may
bring actions for punitive damages,201 and their spouses, like Susan, may
bring an action for non-pecuniary damages, such as loss of society and
consortium.202 In this limited but important situation, Alexander has the
potential to expose employers to greater liability in general maritime tort.
3. The Fifth Circuit Must Clarify Its Decision for Employees and
Employers
If the Fifth Circuit clarifies its decision in Alexander, employees and
employers will be better informed as to their responsibilities and coverage.
The Fifth Circuit needs to clarify what it means to perform work “on board a

198. See Murray, 958 F.2d 127 (extending Miles to deny loss of society
damages to a seaman in an injury case); Guevara, 59 F.3d 1496 (seaman is entitled
to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and
cure, not for Jones Act negligence); McBride, 768 F.3d at 390–91.
199. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902
(2018).
200. If the employer is also the vessel owner and is acting in its capacity as
vessel owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in
that capacity. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F.
App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009).
201. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558 (1818) (stating that punitive damages
may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9
Fed. Cas. 1091, 1093 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 18124) (finding that punitive damages
could be awarded against a vessel master who illegally transported the plaintiff to the
Sandwich Islands); see also In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1972)
(finding that the death claimants’ motion for punitive damages was properly denied
because there was no showing of gross negligence, actual malice, or criminal indifference);
In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that
general maritime law affords the remedy of punitive damages upon a showing of willful
and wanton misconduct by the shipowner). If the worker qualifies as a longshoreman, he
has punitive damages rights in his general maritime law claims. See Rutherford v. Mallard
Bay Drilling, L.L.C., 2000 WL 805230 (E.D. La. June 21, 2000); Robert Force, The
Legacy of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 35, 50 (2006).
202. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170.
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vessel,”203 in terms of the nature and duration of the work being done and
explain the breadth of the Alexander holding. At this point, the Fifth Circuit
may confine the holding to the facts of Alexander-like workers—those who
work on fixed platforms—or may apply the holding to all workers with mixed
employment.204 If the court determines that the Alexander holding does not
extend to all amphibious workers, defining “work on board a vessel” may not
be necessary.
If the holding of Alexander extends to all amphibious employees, then
this decision has greater bearing on those workers who will be barred from
coverage if their work does not qualify as work on board a vessel. From the
language of the Alexander opinion, it appears that the Fifth Circuit intended
this “on a vessel” rule to apply to all workers with mixed employment. Indeed,
the Eastern District of Louisiana is already interpreting Alexander in this
way.205 It is unclear whether this interpretation reflects the Fifth Circuit’s true
intent. The Fifth Circuit must clarify the breadth of its decision because
answering this question is crucial to the subsequent development of the test
for seaman status.
For employers, the solution is more difficult. The Fifth Circuit, through
Alexander, has denied seaman status to a class of amphibious workers, and if
this class seeks damages, these awards could include punitive damages206 and
damages for loss of society and loss of consortium.207 Some of these workers
will qualify for coverage under the LHWCA, which will be their exclusive
remedy against their employer.208 The “dual capacity” doctrine, however,
may apply,209 which could expose the employer to paying worker’s
203. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036
(5th Cir. 2015).
204. See id. at 1035.
205. See Pellegrin v. Montco Oilfield Contractors, L.L.C., 2015 WL 3651159
(E.D. La. June 11, 2015) (applying Alexander’s 30% of time on board a vessel
rule in its determination of whether granting summary judgment on seaman status
was appropriate).
206. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558 (stating that punitive damages
may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher, 9 Fed.
Cas. at 1093 (finding that punitive damages could be awarded against a vessel
master who illegally transported the plaintiff to the Sandwich Islands); see also In
re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d at 1972; In re Complaint of Merry Shipping,
Inc., 650 F.2d 622.
207. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170.
208. The Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §
902 (2018).
209. If the employer is also the vessel owner and acting in its capacity as vessel
owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in that
capacity. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.

1410

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

compensation under the LWHCA and general tort damages.210 Further, within
the Fifth Circuit, if the worker is not covered under either the Jones Act or the
LHWCA but is injured through employer negligence, then that employee may
bring a general maritime law tort claim against his employer.211 Under these
circumstances, the employer is exposed to greater liability. The solution will
depend on the Fifth Circuit’s clarification of the issue of the employee’s
duration and nature requirements. The class of seamen no longer covered
under the Jones Act will affect the employer’s liability.
a. The “On Board a Vessel” Requirement Opposes the Purpose of
the Jones Act
Arguably, clarification is unnecessary because the Alexander rule is
easier to apply than the process of looking at whether the amphibious worker
is doing the ship’s work and is exposed to marine perils. Yet the Jones Act
was enacted in 1920 to further protect sea-based employees from the dangers
of working on navigable waters.212 This “on board a vessel” interpretation,
which detracts from this protection, opposes the purpose of the Jones Act and
the policy behind its creation.213 It cannot be justified by merely aiding
employers in determining coverage because aiding employers while unjustly
depriving “sea-based” employees of seaman status opposes the purpose of the
Jones Act.214
Further, even though general maritime claims for punitive damages and
certain non-pecuniary damages have a higher burden of proof215 than in Jones
Act cases,216 non-seamen workers still will be able to bring claims against
their employers in dual-capacity situations.217 Some of these claims will result
in awards for punitive damages, loss of consortium, and loss of society. The
Fifth Circuit should clarify what it means to be doing work on a vessel and
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F.
App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009).
210. See supra note 209.
211. Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998); see Kermerac v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
212. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 38586 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Estate of Callas
v. United States, 682 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1982).
216. Hoang Do, supra note 11; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d
1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. West Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023, 1025
(D.P.R. 1986).
217. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones
v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009).

2018]

COMMENT

1411

the breadth of its holding in Alexander. Without clarification, the issue of
determining status and coverage will not only continue to plague employers
and employees but also make the process even more challenging. Finally,
amphibious employees like George should qualify as Jones Act seamen
because of the nature of their work and their time spent exposed to marine
perils. These solutions conform to the purpose of the Jones Act and balance
the concerns of maritime employers and employees.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit erroneously interpreted the Chandris holding, reaching
a result that produced unwelcome consequences. The “on a vessel”
requirement will affect the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction
as well as maritime employees and employers. Some “sea-based” employees
will be barred from seaman coverage, whereas their employers will need to
reevaluate the nature of their employees’ work to determine whether they
qualify as seamen, longshoreman, or otherwise. Additionally, employers will
face greater potential liability for workers who no longer qualify as seamen.
Alexander should be clarified to reflect the intended purpose of the Jones
Act218 and the true spirit of Chandris.219 Until either the Fifth Circuit clarifies
the decision or the breadth of the Alexander holding, the court’s “on board a
vessel” interpretation of Chandris and the resulting consequences directly
conflict with the purposes underlying seaman’s protections.

Colton V. Acosta

218. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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